THE New Republic

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Washington Wire

A Dull-Gray Negative

A CROSS-SECTION of the dull-gray Eisenhower May 5 press conference gives the 1959 atmosphere of Washington better than anything we could invent. Asked about the two-term 22nd Amendment he said he didn't feel strongly about it. Asked about the Mississippi lynching he said he "hadn't thought even about the idea that it needs new law in this particular case." Asked about the possibility of a steel strike he said that "the whole 175 million of us" ought to make our "concern clear" but that he opposed federal intervention which would "hurt the American system as we know it, except when we are going to do it in peacetime" (wartime—?). Asked about the two-day Washington rally for aid to India he said he was "massively interested" in India but "fearful" of a massive program of foreign aid. Always the hope of a clarion call, and always the trumpet gives forth an uncertain sound!

It's startling sometimes to note how negative the whole current Washington mood and situation are. The White House is hypotized by the budget; it's presenting no bold new ideas and won't. The White House and Congress are deadlocked between rival parties. Congress had a liberal surge in November, but the Southern leadership has taken care of *that*.

The story about the Luce appointment is negative—she got the job but quit. The Strauss story is the same—emphasis is not on the appointment but on the delay in confirmation. The Rural Electrification bill passed, but was vetoed—the result is negative. House passage last week of the TVA self-financing bill is promising, but all the speculation is over the prospect of veto. The veto stands at the end of every avenue.

Frustration increases. Congress won't increase postal rates as the Administration wants; the Administration won't provide genuine aid for schools as Congress wants. Congress is tempted to take its irritation out on Eisenhower appointments and on foreign aid. Observers say something drastic must be done about the staggering farm support subsidies; well, it won't be.

How about foreign affairs? It's much the same story. Our hopes at Geneva are negative—hold the line, don't yield on Berlin. In the Far East we won't give an inch. We don't even have reporters to tell what's happening in the most populous country on earth, Red China.

Negativism as a national policy is all right where there's no competition. But America has competition. Always Moscow has the initiative on foreign affairs. On domestic affairs the Soviet economy is growing at a rate two or three times as fast as ours; a condition which if continued, said CIA head Allen Dulles, would spell "economic suicide."

Besides growing at a faster rate there are some signs that Russia is distributing its economic gains more fairly. As the richest nation on earth the US still leaves one-sixth of its people in poverty. The Soviet is just emerging from the starvation level. Comparisons are difficult. But as Senator Fulbright noted in his May 7 Columbia University speech, "the Soviet Union devotes 8 percent of its gross national production to education while the US devotes but 3 or 4 percent." Better education, even more than the income tax, is the ultimate equalizer.

The Ft. Monmouth Madness

IN CONNECTION with our comments on McCarthy and the Ft. Monmouth (NJ) investigation the other day, a correspondent writes that Ira Katchen and Harry Green, lawyers for defendants in that madness, are writing a book *Courage Is Contagious*. The point they raise was the hidden anti-Semitic nature of the attack and the curious and, as it seemed to them, timid silence of Jewish defense groups like the American Jewish Committee and Anti-Defamation League. A small local fortnightly tabloid, *The American Jewish Ledger*, published in Newark, N. J., was the shining exception. Of the 60 accused in the Ft. Monmouth case, according to Green, two were Negroes, two Protestants, one Catholic and the rest nearly all Jews. The lawyers fought some of the cases through to the Supreme Court. They finally report vindication for every client. But where was their support?

Speaking of newspapers, some enterprising reporter on the *New York Times* in 1948 might have won a Pulitzer prize by exposing the payoffs his management and the *New York Mirror* were making to racketeers and extortionists to get their Sunday supplements delivered from New Jersey through a September Teamsters' strike. The McClellan Committee reveals that these ugly payoffs amounted to $250 to $375 a truckload and totaled $45,750. The *New York Times* played the McClellan expose on page one, using AP, and rather uncomfortably promised not to err again.

Harassing the Court

HOW GREAT an incubus the South is to the Democrats in the Senate was vividly illustrated in the 70-17 vote confirming Potter Stewart as Supreme Court Justice, May 5. Every negative vote came from a Southerner. Why? Because the high court has unanimously approved school integration and because Stewart showed he would support the will of the nation and the direction of the Constitution. Therefore the Southern group declared war on him and succeeded in delaying confirmation seven months. Presumably they will do the same thing for every new appointee from now on. The Southern group is small but deeply entrenched by seniority. The 17 included the chairmen of these committees—Foreign Relations, Government Operations, Armed Services, Labor & Public Welfare, Agriculture, Judiciary, Post Office, Finance, and Banking & Currency—nine of the 15 most powerful standing committees of the Senate.

All signs point to a business boom lasting through 1960; it will aid Republicans. . . . Khrushchev can't visit the US, officials say, because he wouldn't be safe; the US is the only big country where revolvers are sold at corner hardware stores—one reason our murder rate tops all other nations.

T.R.B.

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Wages and Profits

IN THE MIDDLE of the battle of advertisements between the steel companies (which correctly point to high average steel wages) and the steel union (which with equal accuracy identifies handsome steel profits) have appeared the first quarter financial statements of our leading manufacturers, railroads, and utilities. The tale they tell must rejoice the hearts of stockholders. For the 441 firms whose earnings were tabulated by the *Wall Street Journal*, the average improvement was 53.9 percent. In some ways, the 1958 figures are even more impressive than the current ones, for they emphasize the knack that our industrial giants have acquired of making substantial returns on investment even when business is bad. At the depth of the recession, every industry except the airlines operated in the black. Unemployment lingers and some workers have apparently suffered permanent displacement, but the concentrated industries have proved that they can raise prices and enjoy some profits even in the face of declining national income, aggregate demand and total employment.

Does this favorable profit picture imply that unions are justified in asking for substantial wage increases? In particular, is the steel union now right in seeking to unlock that pirate chest of treasure which one of its recent advertisements featured? These are questions which most economists, when they are completely honest with their audiences, will hesitate to answer dogmatically. There is good reason to hesitate: the simple faith of the past in the free market determination of prices, profits and wages has faltered in the presence of the modern phenomena of oligopoly, price leadership and concentrated industry control. And, unfortunately, nothing has replaced the public's simple faith in competition. Since the justification of the corporation is profit not public service, it does no good to urge self-restraint upon industrial leaders. Since union leaders maintain their positions and their prestige by improving their members' earnings, similar appeals to them to ask for less than they can get are likewise useless.

Rather than exhorting management and unions to be untrue to their natures, what is needed is a national wage-price policy consistent with the 1959 facts of life. The current conservative favorite is productivity: let labor be content with wage increases no greater than the per capita increase in average product; if labor costs remain stable, so the argument runs, then the pressure on prices will be relieved. But at best, productivity is a crude statistical measure, giving us no help in establishing the structure of wage differentials in the modern factory situation in which individual contributions are merged into a cooperative product. Exclusive reliance on the productivity criterion assumes that present differentials between industries and between occupations accurately reflect the past record of productivity. It implies also that there are no inequities in present wage rates. Finally, it tacitly concedes the equity of present profit rates and the current division of sales income between workers and shareholders.

But productivity is not a reliable guide, if the free market has long since

Correspondence

► *Why Fifty States?*

SIRS:

NOT since the heyday of Henry L. Mencken has an idea as sensible as Gerald W. Johnson's April 20 *(New Republic)* discussion of the asininity of having 50 states come out of either Washington or Baltimore. Mr. Johnson

(Continued on page 23)

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broken down, and if, as Gardiner Means has reminded us, prices in concentrated industries respond only feebly to changes in their environment, what is left? We are left with two major alternatives: either a greater effort to reestablish competition in such concentrated industries as steel by breaking up the largest enterprises or the imposition of some kind of public surveillance over prices in the major industries.

Neither of these alternatives is likely to become popular in the near future. It is from the commendable standpoint of doing something immediately about a problem whose ultimate solution is unclear that it is possible to welcome the bills that have emerged from Senator Kefauver's investigation of pricing. A common feature of these suggestions is the requirement that the concentrated industries give notice of their intentions to raise prices, and that in the interval between notice and actual price increase a public board review the justification for advances. Such a Board would have the advantage of focusing attention on corporate pricing, rendering more difficult the frequently collusive pattern of wage and price increases between unions and companies and hastening the clearer definition of adequate standards for both wages and profits.

The suspicious agreement between the Steel Workers' Union and the big steel companies that they want no public interference in their current negotiations suggests a common feeling that each can do better by using its power against the other, and the public. It suggests as well that in these negotiations as well as in simple cases of price increases the general public badly needs a spokesman.

Gentlemen, Be Seated

AFTER an opening game of musical chairs, the diplomats in Geneva have found their seats and have begun to warm them. The aim of each participant is unchanged; each is bent on consolidating its power rather than risking future losses through present concessions. The West is handicapped by a spiritless US leadership. The Russians hold the trump card of being able at will to give their East German satellite authority to deal directly with the West over Berlin. The Soviet leaders know too that our reliance on the deterrent effect of nuclear super-weapons has jeopardized our ability to enforce our rights short of a devastating nuclear attack; and it has surely occurred to Khrushchev that neither we nor our European allies will massively retaliate should access to Berlin be impeded.

Still, East and West will probably remain in their Summit seats for some time. And this is not merely because Khrushchev would have it so. It should not be forgotten that in the US, Britain and West Germany there are strong though hidden pressures on politicians to provide during coming months the appearance if not the reality of peace-making. For in all three countries, national elections are not far off, and those who must soon be judged by their electorates dare not let it be thought that they are unwilling to sit down with Mr. K.

Seldom have so many expected so little from a meeting of such consequence. And though some correspondents in Geneva are being consoled by the fact that at least the talks are buying time, of what use is time, one may ask, if it brings only greater suspicion and a growing and mutual capacity for destruction?

NATO and Spain

WHEN THE Western Foreign Ministers met in Paris two weeks ago to concert their tactics for the current meeting with Gromyko in Geneva, they were surprised to find the French Government canvassing for the admission of Spain into NATO. It would be difficult to think of a better way of undermining Western unity at this precarious moment. Yet the French initiative is supported by at least three of NATO's Southern members—Portugal, Italy, and Turkey. And there is reason to think the State Department is not unsympathetic to the idea. The last time the admission of Spain to NATO was raised in 1956 the Norwegian Government publicly threatened to veto it, and there is no doubt that Denmark would do likewise. The British Government, although its present Colonial Secretary was one of Franco's most ardent supporters during the Civil War, much regrets the recent French attempt to revive the issue.

Membership of Spain would add nothing to NATO's military strength. Our government already has air and naval bases in Spain under bilateral arrangements—which cost us very dearly. No other member of NATO needs bases in Spain, and since neither our Strategic Air Command nor Sixth Fleet is integrated into the NATO command structure, there would not even be an administrative convenience in putting their Spanish bases under NATO.

Spain could make no contribution of her own to NATO's forces, since her 18 divisions are territorial units whose main function is to repress internal opposition. Franco himself has told his army that "of various fronts, the most dangerous is the internal." Indeed his regime is exceptionally shaky at this moment since he is likely to retire in the near future and his possible successors are already struggling with one another for first place. There is a good chance that the next Spanish Government will move, however timidly, away from repressive dictatorship. The admission of Spain to NATO at this stage would be generally regretted by Spaniards—a great many of whom are increasingly anti-Franco—as needlessly bestowing yet another blessing on an unpopular and waning regime.

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Just a Little Fallout

THE CONGRESSIONAL hearing on atomic fallout last week was a complete farce. The Committee which held the hearing was assured by Atomic Energy scientists that there was no need to worry. And since this was apparently what most of the Congressmen wanted to hear, they made no attempt to call scientists who might tell them otherwise. When the statements of witnesses conflicted—as happened a few times—they tried not to notice. When questions turned out to be too sticky, they helped pull the witnesses out.

Chairman Chet Holifield (D, Cal.) and Sen. John O. Pastore (D, R.I.) castigated *The Washington Post* for delving into the mass of AEC reports that were quietly inserted into the record. The *Post* came across some figures which showed that bread and flour being sold in a New York City supermarket on February 10 had four to 18 times as much radioactive strontium-90 as considered "permissible." "Irresponsible reporting," said the Congressmen. The scientists who testified in person poohpoohed the danger. Other scientists, permitted to insert statements into the record, sounded ominous warnings but were not called upon. The Committee said it didn't have time to hear everyone. The newspaper reporters and the radio and TV commentators, buried under an avalanche of reports each day that they had no time or inclination to read, reported only on the oral testimony—as must have been expected. Whenever the questions became too difficult, AEC scientists pointed out that 40,000 people are killed each year in automobile accidents. When one was asked if the New York City bread and flour were not just isolated cases, he talked about the danger of polluting ants and auto exhaust fumes. The Committee let him slip by.

During the four-day hearing an Air Force scientist said the fallout at one location he checked was producing half as much radiation as that from natural sources of radiation in the earth, air and water. AEC scientists added that radiation from fallout was less than five percent of the natural background level. The Committee didn't worry about the difference, for the words "natural background" made it seem safe. No mention was made of studies in New York State and Maryland which were beginning to show a correlation between cancer and the natural background radiation.

The AEC's General Advisory Committee of civilian scientists reassured the Committee that all was well, pointing out that the background radiation in some parts of the world was five times that in the US and that the people there seemed to be getting along fine. They didn't bother to add that no studies have been made in these areas on which to base such a conclusion. Or that the AEC has stated in an official publication that a level of radiation three times the background level may produce about

"Well—Ha Ha—None of Us Is Perfect"

500,000 genetic defects per generation—17,000 per year.

The Chairman talked blithely about scraping off a few inches of topsoil when the fallout became too high. The scientists talked about testing underground and halfway to the moon in order to eliminate the fallout problem, but a weapons expert said "useless": Testing must be done in the environment in which the weapon is to be used. The Committee didn't seem to hear the quiet explosion when the AEC revealed that the weapons tested during the past few years were "dirty" super-bombs, not the "clean" bombs piously talked about by Lewis L. Strauss when he was Chairman of the AEC. Nor did they challenge witnesses who kept blaming the fallout on the Russians although official AEC data released during the hearings showed that the US tests during the last few years were equally dirty.

No one seemed to be concerned about the fact that England had begun to test weapons, that France was about to begin, and that Sweden was debating the step. No one seemed worried about what would happen five or ten years from now when Red China begins to develop nuclear weapons.

When the Joint Atomic Energy Subcommittee on Radiation holds a further hearing next month on the effects of a nuclear attack, opponents of an atomic test ban will argue, citing last week's hearing, that a little fallout from testing and a few tens of thousands of cases of genetic and somatic damage will not be too great a price to pay if it prevents a war that will kill hundreds of millions. And who will answer their arguments?

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German Pessimism Over the Geneva Talks

Bonn

NEVER have Germans been more openly pessimistic over the prospects of an international conference on the German question than they are today. A few days before the Foreign Ministers assembled in Geneva, Erich Ollenhauer, Chairman of the Social Democratic Party, gave a gloomy summary of all the unfortunate consequences which he expected to arise out of a failure to make progress. On being asked what his hopes for Geneva were Ludwig Erhard, Federal Minister of Economics and Adenauer's most likely successor as Chancellor, said that the best that could be expected was that the situation should not deteriorate further during the summer and the risk of war not become greater.

What do thinking Germans expect to come out of the Geneva Conference? In the first place they expect some declaration of limited progress, but no real progress. The declaration will be in the nature of a face-saver for both the US and French Governments, which have both indicated that a measure of progress is a condition for the holding of a later Summit meeting. The real underlying reason for any such declaration, then, will be Khrushchev's desire to meet the Heads of States.

In the second place, most Germans expect the present Conference to produce an agenda, or at least the skeleton of an agenda, for the Summit meeting. If hope plays any part in this expectation, then it is limited to the simple wish that German reunification and European security will be included on that agenda. Yet even this may be unattainable, and the consequences of failure would be the Ollenhauer catalogue of evils to come —including renewed pressure on West Berlin, a separate peace-treaty for the East German Republic, a speeded up tempo of rearmament in general and the inclusion of Western Germany in the "nuclear-weapon club."

Finally, the German expectation is that a lot of hot air will come out of Geneva and that the Conference will last about three weeks. In this time it may be possible to agree on a formula which suggests "limited progress," and, in any event, it will not be necessary to do more than that. Khrushchev has shown plainly enough that business can be done with him but not with his underlings. The hot air will come out of the open sessions of the Conference which will be treated largely as occasions for barrages of propaganda.

It is easy enough to explain why German opinion is so guardedly pessimistic. The first reason is the wide difference of views between the main West German political parties. Not the slightest effort has been made to find a common line for the parties, other than the somewhat misguided Free Democratic proposal that the Geneva Conference should be used as an occasion for the East and West German observer-delegations to get together and discuss the details of German reunification. The Free Democrats must have known that there was only one chance in ten of Adenauer's approving this. And that chance could only have arisen if he had been allowed to put forward the idea as his own.

Even more operative than the differences between the West German parties are the differences between the Western Allies. No matter how general the agreement on aims and "principles," it has been painfully obvious that there has been no unanimity over tactics. Adenauer believed that the old formula of making no concessions of any kind until the Soviet Union agreed to free, all-German elections was still valid. To Macmillan's tiresome—as Adenauer saw it—inventiveness was added General de Gaulle's ready recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line as Germany's eastern frontier. Then came the American idea—still discreetly veiled—of "phased reunification." This, too, conflicts with Adenauer's view that the people of Eastern Germany must be given their freedom in one bite, through elections whose results would be implemented at once.

The differences between the Western Allies have made it impossible to develop the new, more flexible approach which alone may offer hope of a settlement of the German question. Only one man in the Federal Government ranks has recognized this—or, at least, has publicly said so. Dr. Eugen Gerstenmaier, the President of the Bundestag, has twice argued publicly for examination of the following possibilities: the relaxation of tension by proposing zones of limited and equalized armaments in Central Europe, the setting at rest of Russian fears by agreeing on the military status of a reunified Germany, the discussion of a German Peace Treaty without insisting on parallel discussion of reunification. All of these possibilities are anathema to Adenauer. The fact that he has suggested them has probably put Gerstenmaier out of the running in the 1961 Federal Election, which will be held after the Adenauer foreign policy may have been proved wrong.

GERMAN pessimism does not seem to be ill-founded. The present cycle of conferences has been induced only by Khrushchev's physical threat to West Berlin and political threat to sign a separate peace treaty with the East German Republic. These threats have never been withdrawn; they have only been deferred. Only sweeping Western counter-proposals could induce Khrushchev to hold his hand, but there is as yet no evidence that any such counter-proposals have been worked out. If indeed they have, the Western statesmen concerned will deserve immense credit for the secrecy and surprise which they will have achieved. But if not, then the logic of German pessimism will be shown in the gathering tension following the Summit conference.

TERENCE PRITTIE

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The Superficial Aspect

"Pass the Biscuits"

EX-PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S disgust with the Pass-the-Biscuits Amendment, formally enumerated as the Twenty-Second, is easily understood, but it is limited in scope. It is the opinion of a man who knows the political as well as the legal burdens of the Presidency and who therefore opposes laying any avoidable handicap on the man who holds the office.

But for the unofficial and not even ex-official citizen the thing has another and even more sinister significance. No doubt the amendment was in part spite-work, a studied insult to the memory of Franklin D. Roosevelt; but beyond that it had a strong appeal to politicians of mediocre or less ability. It is an expression of the old "rotation in office" idea, one of the pernicious encrustations on democratic theory.

The idea was perfectly expressed by one of those curiosities constantly being thrown to the surface of the seething pot of Texas politics. Some years ago he ran for office on a platform whose only important plank was the injunction, "Pass the biscuits, Pappy." The basis of this plea is the theory that public office is not a public trust, but a public handout, earned by work, not for the public, but for the party.

It is a theory cherished by inferior men, constantly annoyed by the success of their betters. This annoyance is fearfully exacerbated when a really adroit politician wins victory after victory. It was lifted to the level of madness when Roosevelt four times won the gaudiest office of all and it became evident that there wasn't a politician smart enough to lick him in a fair fight.

Naturally, inferior men were incapable of attributing this to its real cause, to wit, their own inferiority, so they evolved the curious theory that Roosevelt did it, not by winning the confidence of the people, but by using the powers of the office, especially its patronage. This necessarily implied that a majority of American voters are open to either bribery or blackmail; but the implication troubled no inferior politician who invariably cherishes a secret contempt for the suckers who are trapped by his balderdash.

So they determined to make it impossible for any man hereafter, no matter how superior, to exasperate them in that fashion. The sinister factor in the situation is that they put this scheme over. The Twenty-Second Amendment was adopted by some 5,000 men, all of them politicians—a majority of the 531 members of the House and Senate, and majorities in the Legislatures of 36 states. This amendment was not, like the Twenty-First, ratified in the several states by conventions elected for the purpose; so no one except politicians had a chance to vote on it.

So Pappy must pass the biscuits after a second term, and the people are helpless to do anything about it. They are rendered helpless because there is a provision in the organic law based on the assumption that they can be bribed or browbeaten into voting for an incumbent no matter how obviously unfit for the office he may be.

The amendment does, as Mr. Truman pointed out, strip a President of much of his power during his second term, but it does worse than that—it strips the people of their right to elect as President any native American whom they choose to put into the White House.

It is important that the President should not be handicapped in the performance of his duties, but it is far more important that the people shall not be deprived of the right to say who shall occupy that office. We may make a mistake, and if we do we will, and should, pay for it; but the right to make our own mistakes is of the very essence of political freedom.

THE Eighteenth Amendment was not half the infringement of personal liberty that the Twenty-Second is, for in the Eighteenth the politicians presumed to dictate only our physical habits, while in the Twenty-Second they presume to dictate our way of thinking. They forbid us to repose confidence in the man of our choice if he is keeping out of the office some politician whom we deem inferior, but who hungers for the job.

We must pass the biscuits in order that as many as possible of the hungry may be fed. Skill, sharpened by experience in the office, counts for nothing. The trust and confidence of the people count for nothing. The possible lack of any man of equal competence counts for nothing. All that counts is that sustenance shall be evenly distributed to the ravenous, whether they are competent or not.

Passing the biscuits may be an excellent policy for a swineherd, whose aim is to fatten all the animals equally. But to impose it upon a nation struggling to master the infinitely difficult art of self-government is more than an injury and more than an insult. It is an imbecility.

GERALD W. JOHNSON

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Solution for Berlin - II

Lord Henderson *Theodor Eschenburg*
Frank Church *Max Beloff* *Karl Jaspers*

As THE *Foreign Ministers assemble in Geneva, working parties of the Western foreign offices debate what response should be made in the likely event that the Soviet Union rejects the West's "package proposal" for a German settlement. High on the list of alternative "fallback" positions under discussion are Walter Lippmann's suggestions for dealing with the immediate problem of Berlin's future. Mr. Lippmann's conclusion—stated in a series of four recent newspaper articles—calls for recognizing that "German reunification has for the foreseeable future ceased to be practical politics" and that Berlin "must be protected in a special way while Germany remains divided." What is called for, Mr. Lippmann argues, is negotiation of a new statute "in which the future of Berlin is put in trust with the United Nations," and which spells out "the right of access, the conditions of co-existence, the relations between the two Berlins and the two Germanies and the presence of Allied [and] UN token military forces." Last week we published the views of Louis J. Halle, C. L. Sulzberger, Hans J. Morgenthau, Hubert H. Humphrey, Richard Lowenthal, Terence Prittie and Otto Heinrich von der Gablentz on Mr. Lippmann's thesis. Following are five additional comments.*

Narrowing the Issues

MR. WALTER LIPPMANN has rendered an international public service by his brilliant analysis of the German situation. The forthcoming Foreign Ministers' meeting will only be successful if it leads to a Summit Conference, and one hopes that his specific Berlin proposal is already being seriously considered in responsible Western circles and that it will find a place—along with other proposals—in the Foreign Ministers' discussions.

The value of Mr. Lippmann's analysis is that it calls attention to the realities of the situation: it does not burke hard facts because they may be disagreeable in some Western quarters.

There are now in fact, as Mr. Lippmann points out, two German States. Governments may continue to shy away from recognizing it as an inescapable fact in the situation, but account of it is taken in the German Social Democratic Party's "Plan for Germany," which seems to me to involve *de facto* recognition of the East German Government in the developing processes of consultation and cooperation proposed.

I agree with Mr. Lippmann that there is little or no prospect of these two States being reunited in a single Germany in the foreseeable future. So long as both East and West stand pat on their declared positions there will continue to be an irreconcilable conflict of principle, and there seems little prospect of the deadlock being broken in any early negotiations.

It is clear, however, that the situation within Berlin will undergo a change in the near future. Mr. Khrushchev has resolved to make a new deal over Berlin—and he will do it, either as part of a new agreement with the Western Powers, or with the East German authorities direct in the absence of such an agreement.

It may be true in the long run that the problem of Berlin cannot be divorced from the problem of German reunification, and that the latter is related to the problem of European security. But as things are now the problem of German reunification cannot be separated from the complex of stresses and pressures between East and West, which have only been confined within the present uneasy European equilibrium because mutual possession of the nuclear deterrent has compelled both sides to recognize that they have a common need and duty to prevent war. And, as experience in recent years has shown, progress to relax these tensions and pressures is very difficult to make.

There can be no doubt that the reunification of the two German States, with their differing political, economic, currency and trade systems, their opposite alliances and their conflicting ideological outlooks, would prove a formidable problem for the Germans themselves to solve, even in vastly more favorable conditions than those which obtain today.

To produce more favorable conditions is going to be a long-term task, and I am not over optimistic about the Foreign Ministers' meeting, or a later Summit Conference, succeeding in carrying Europe any real distance

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along the road to greater security through some regional, limited measure of controlled and inspected disarmament, thereby opening a way to a stage-by-stage advance toward the fusion of the two German States. If in the event the coming negotiations were to fail on these wider issues, we would then have to reconcile ourselves to the continued partition of Germany.

The problem of Berlin, on the other hand, has a special element of urgency of its own, since Soviet Russia will make unilateral changes in default of a Four Power Agreement. The fact is that while Soviet Russia can veto German reunification in freedom, the Western Powers cannot veto Russia's unilateral action on Berlin. What they can do and should do is to endeavor to negotiate a new status for the City and ensure that it does not weaken the authority of the West Berlin Administration or its links with the Federal Republic. This new status must not only find acceptance by East and West, but also by the West Berliners, whose lives and liberties are most immediately concerned.

MR. LIPPMANN'S suggestion of "a city within a city and within a foreign state" is both imaginative and realistic. West Berlin's rights and the rights of the Western Allies would be confirmed in a new Charter or Statute in which encircled West Berlin would be guaranteed an ordered future by the presence of Western troops, acting under international auspices. This proposal has a great deal to commend it; the new Statute should not supplant but derive from and maintain the equality of rights and responsibilities which the Four Powers hold from the unconditional surrender of defeated Hitler Germany. United Nations participation would give genuine international significance and strength to new arrangements for West Berlin's secure and ordered future. There would also be practical advantages in having United Nations observers to keep a watchful eye on the operation of free land and air access to West Berlin. The United Nations can, in my judgment, play an effective peace role in any new plan for the future of the "city within a city."

There is also, I believe, a case for considering whether the existing restrictions on West Berlin's Parliamentary representatives should not be removed. West Berliners attend the German Federal Parliament only as observers; if my memory serves me aright, the three Western Powers imposed this limitation in order to safeguard their own legal rights and responsibilities in Berlin. I have not visited West Berlin for some years and have, therefore, had no recent opportunity of discovering the views of the West Berlin authorities on this point, but it seems to me that this discriminatory restriction—which has operated now for nearly 10 years—should be reviewed and removed by the Western Foreign Ministers now that they have the future of West Berlin under consideration. I can see no valid reason why the political links between West Berlin and Federal Germany should be inferior to those between East Berlin and East Germany.

To my mind the minimum result of the coming negotiations should be to take the heat out of the Berlin problem and remove the anxieties and tensions which have bedeviled the daily life of the West Berliners and threatened the peace of Europe for a decade.

LORD HENDERSON

London

LORD HENDERSON, *a one-time journalist, served the Labour Party as an M.P., a Parliamentary Private Secretary and, from 1948 to 1951, as Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. He later was the British representative at the Assembly of the Council of Europe and presently sits in the House of Lords.*

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The Russian Motives

THE WORLD TODAY seems to be so continuously teetering on the brink of disaster that our nerves sometimes threaten to usurp our judgment. The prospect of nuclear war is so appalling that we are dismayed at the lack of progress toward genuine peace. When approaching the conference table, we tend to set our sights higher than logic would justify.

This, I think, is a lesson implicit in Mr. Lippmann's analysis of the Berlin crisis.

He writes: "We shall be better off and we shall feel better about it all if we grasp the realities and do not evade them."

As Mr. Lippmann clearly points out, the existence of two German states is a fact. Neither we nor the Soviet Union are willing to permit the loss of either half to the other. This conflict of immovable interest is therefore a powerful force operating at the moment against

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any major settlement in the heart of Europe.

The reality that emerges from this analysis, as I see it, is the likelihood that no forthcoming Foreign Ministers' or Summit conference will effect much change in Middle Europe.

If this is so, the worst mistake we could make would be to approach the negotiations with any notion of acquiescing to the implications contained in Mr. Khrushchev's November ultimatum.

Any retreat, including a reduction of Allied troops in Berlin to token size, might open the Pandora's box of fear that we are unable and unwilling to hold the line against determined Russian pressure to break it.

Of course there are concessions that Russia could make that would justify a withdrawal on our part. I would applaud concessions on both sides, provided they are genuinely reciprocal. But I see nothing in the present situation, or in the Russian attitude, to indicate that they will agree to concessions commensurate with the ones they are demanding of us. For what were Russia's motivations in handing down its ultimatum?

It has been suggested that Russia instigated the Berlin crisis to consolidate her hold on restive East Germany and the other satellite countries. But it is hard to see why, in the first place, this was necessary, or secondly, why it was worth the risk of a major war. For here, time and the status quo would seem to be on Russia's side.

More than three million East Germans have fled the puppet state since the end of World War II. These refugees were undoubtedly the most vehement opponents of the Communist regime. Presumably those who remain are more able to adjust themselves to the life there. And given the customary Communist methods of indoctrination and education, the younger generations, as they replace the old, will grow to know less and less about the free way of life.

THE argument that Russia is really motivated by a fear of West German rearmament does not seem very convincing either. Is it plausible to say that the Soviet Union, with its 175 active divisions, feels seriously threatened by eight or nine West German divisions?

It would seem more likely that Russia's motivations go farther. Doubtlessly the Kremlin hopes to loosen West Germany from NATO. Perhaps it even hopes to panic the West and unravel the NATO alliance itself.

Given such objectives, and having been summoned to the conference table by a Russian ultimatum, it is difficult to visualize how we can find a way to join the Soviets in any acceptable plan for a general settlement in Middle Europe.

So Mr. Lippmann's approach is a realistic one. Without raising vain hopes, he has suggested a formula for Berlin that might serve the interests of both East and West, and thus prove a negotiable subject. It is based on a recognition that Berlin is going to remain an enclave in East Germany for some time to come, and that we are going to have to deal with Berlin apart from the question of a German settlement.

Perhaps there are some other attendant subjects suitable for negotiation at this time. The possibility of establishing a demilitarized corridor of some kind along the East-West German boundary line certainly ought to be explored.

When all is said and done, however, our range of opportunity in the coming negotiations is going to be narrow. Western Europe must be defended against further Russian encroachment, and West Germany is indispensable to that defense. We must not acquiesce in any new arrangement respecting Berlin that will weaken or undermine the strength and stability of the Western alliance.

FRANK CHURCH

Washington, D. C.

A "Free-wheeling" Germany

MR. LIPPMANN'S articles on "The Two Germanies and Berlin" have a great advantage over so many discussions of the subject in that they do not seek to avoid saying things which are bound to offend against some current assumptions as to how things are and what people really want. They have been given even greater topicality by the likelihood that a new German Chancellor, whatever the measure of Dr. Adenauer's surviving influence, will not be able to avoid some radical rethinking of the position, quite apart from the intensity of the pressure about the Berlin question that the Russians may contrive in the course of the summer. My own views as to a desirable solution where Berlin is concerned are not far removed from Mr. Lippmann's. But in order to see what chances it offers Western policy-makers, it is necessary to look more closely at some of the points that Mr. Lippmann makes. I would suggest that the following at least require further examination on the part of those in a position to undertake it:

1. While it is true to say that fear of a reunited Germany is widespread in both halves of Europe, it is generally realized among the more rational students of international politics that this ought not to be because of what a reunited Germany could do on its own; Germany is and can only be a power of the second rank by the standards of the second half of the 20th Century. What causes worry is the possibility of diplomatic adventures or even military adventures in which such a Germany might engage; and that there might be a danger here is confirmed by the outraged feelings expressed by the Germans when it is suggested (as recently by General de Gaulle) that the Oder-Neisse line should be recognized as a permanent frontier. For Germans, Germany is divided into three parts not two; and what we call Eastern

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Germany, they call Central Germany. It is therefore a "free-wheeling" Germany that is feared, and it is a common interest of Germany's neighbors, or felt to be, that this situation should not become actual.

Many people would be strengthened in these fears by doubting whether Mr. Lippmann is right about the two Germanies having grown so far apart. There seems no evidence for the view—and continued evidence against it—that the East Germans have settled down to Communism, or that a Hungarian situation would not be reproduced if there was a certainty of no Russian intervention, The stabilization of East Europe at the present level of political development may be impossible for a long time. One objective of Western policy must be to make a liberalization of the regimes there possible by peaceful development though without liberalization in Russia there are narrow limits to this process, as Poland has shown. On the other hand, there is no argument in this for not recognizing the actual existence for the time being of the East German Government and of ceasing the pretense which Western Germany's own actions belie that it is not for the time being the *de facto* authority. Non-recognition of a *de facto* government is almost always political folly; nor in certain circumstances ought confederation to be ruled out; the determining factor ought to be the general system of security into which this might be fitted. Politically, if liberalization is what we are after, more contacts between East and West are desirable rather than the reverse.

3. Mr. Lippmann probably overestimates the utility of the "Europe of the Six" as a method of containing Western Germany and the appeal of the Little Europe idea generally. Recent developments in France do not suggest any belief in the virtues of supra-national institutions, rather the reverse. And the Adenauer-de Gaulle line-up almost certainly has tactical rather than long-term significance. The further breaking-up of Europe which the development of the Little Europe idea would mean is not in the best interests of the continent. It is too divided already.

4. For this reason, the heart of the matter lies in the effect of any major political change upon the defense structure of NATO; if the present line of political and military division is as good as we can hope to get—and this appears to be in accordance with current military thinking—then there is nothing to negotiate about except the political-military anomaly presented by Berlin being on the wrong side of the "curtain." If NATO plans were capable of revision perhaps with the development of new strategic concepts, then the question of the political and human price of perpetuating the division of Germany and so of cutting ourselves off very largely from the rest of Eastern Europe would have to be faced.

5. With regard to Berlin, Mr. Lippmann is obviously right in warning us against our reliance on the "right of conquest" which gets less and less plausible as the war recedes in time. We should proclaim an international interest in maintaining the self-determination of its inhabitants; and it is probably a pity that we have not seized the political initiative and offered to have the *whole* city a free city under the United Nations pending reunification.

6. We have to guard against two dangers in framing our own policy; one, about which Mr. Lippmann is clear and definite, is the danger of seeming to be responsible for perpetuating tensions not for the sake of real objectives but in order to maintain comforting illusions. The other which he emphasizes less is the importance of not writing off the legitimate expectations of the East European peoples for more political liberty and greater security. It is not for the sake of Germany but for the sake of Europe as a whole that we must beware of solutions that look like rolling up the map of Europe for good.

7. We must not expect a Berlin solution to work miracles even if the Russians can be persuaded to adopt it by the appropriate mixture of firmness and persuasion. It will not close the books. We shall eventually have to face the problem of disengagement; militarily attractive to the Russians but politically dangerous; politically attractive to the West, but militarily at the moment unacceptable. Which veto will prove more enduring? That is the great question.

MAX BELOFF

Oxford

The Risks of UN Control

I AGREE with Walter Lippmann that a new legal status has to be created for West Berlin, one that is internationally recognized, for the safeguard of which the presence of Western Allied troops is required. This status should make it clear that West Berlin would be allowed to maintain its economic, financial, cultural and legal relations with the German Federal Republic as they are today. The unalterable maintenance of those relations with the Federal Republic as well as with other powers is as important as the continuing presence of Western Allied troops.

An additional legal safeguard by means of a United Nations guarantee is very desirable. But placing West Berlin under the complete supervision of the UN has some risky implications in view of the fact that the Soviet Union and its satellites are all members of the UN. The Soviet Union can block every resolution of the Security Council with its veto. Were the UN to act as the only authorized guarantor, new and heavy conflicts could arise as a result of the UN Council's heterogeneous membership.

I gather that under Lippmann's proposals East Berlin would be recognized as a part of the DDR. But placing

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West Berlin under the supervision of the UN would actually mean discrimination against the West, since the Soviet Union and its satellites are members of the UN. West Berlin should really be made a legal part of the Federal Republic as the West German states are. Since this is impossible—because such a solution would only lead to innumerable new and immediate conflicts between the Federal Republic and the DDR—West Berlin's safety has to remain entrusted to those powers who are interested in safeguarding it since the UN's interest is a divided one. The UN could, however, act as a referee.

There is unfortunately no precedent for Berlin's legal status. Unlike Lippmann, I cannot regard the Lateran treaties of 1929 as a suitable model. I do think, however, that some of the clauses from these treaties might serve as a model. The Vatican City with its population of about 1,000 cannot be compared to Berlin with its 2.2 million inhabitants. Except for those connected with the foreign missions in the Vatican, the rest of the population all have one and the same employer. The town administration of Vatican City is not elected but merely an agency of the office of the Pope. There is no danger of political plotting and undermining here at all. There are no economic and social problems. Furthermore, it seems very doubtful that the Papal Office would continue to stay and function in the Vatican City if Italy were ever to become a Communist state.

THE heart of the German problem at present is not reunification but the right of self-rule for the people in the Soviet-occupied Zone. This area, while carrying the name of the German Democratic Republic, is little more than a colony of the Soviet Union. What really matters is that the Soviet-occupied Zone receives the right to decide its constitution and government by means of free elections. If this right of self-rule can be obtained by temporarily shelving the reunification question, we must do so. The state which evolved from the realization of self-rule in the Soviet Zone would be somewhat different from the Federal Republic as a result of its completely different social structure and development.

Founded on its newly achieved right of self-determination, this new state would stand in a similar position to Russia as Finland. But any disengagement arrangement in Central Europe, even if that were to consist of nothing more than the freezing of the present disarmament status, would be impossible for the Federal Republic and the Western Allies to accept if it means that the Federal Republic's next-door neighbor was to be a Communist ruled state, always ready for civil war. An essential condition for any kind of disengagement arrangement, therefore, is realization of the right of self-determination for the Soviet Zone.

THEODOR ESCHENBURG

Tubingen

The UN Is Undependable

MR. LIPPMANN proposes: Recognition of the East German regime and a new status for the security of Berlin in cooperation with the United Nations. The proposals are exciting. My response will have to be limited to a few lines.

In negotiating with the totalitarian Russian regime it should not be forgotten for even an instant that coexistence is conceived of entirely differently in the East than it is in the West. The totalitarian Soviet regime cannot tolerate a state of tranquillity. . . . It is true that the Soviet Union has made some exceptions in its ruthless march toward expansion — as, for example, in agreeing to the release and neutralization of Austria. The question is whether something similar can be achieved in the Berlin crisis. And for this reason Walter Lippmann's proposals should be weighed thoroughly.

Russia wants to retain East Germany as a Communist state. Of that there is not the slightest doubt. Its satellite system would collapse if East Germany were set free. Russia thus demands recognition of the East German Communist regime. Reunification of Germany as it was in Bismarck's day is impossible in the foreseeable future. That being so, the question therefore is whether *de facto* recognition of the existing East German regime could be granted by the West in return for something of corresponding value. It seems to me that the deciding factor here for politically clearly-thinking Germans is not so much reunification as the political freedom of our countrymen in the East, who are tied to us through the common bonds of language, tradition, culture, and who are suffering in silence. The neutralization of East Germany on the Austrian pattern would be a worthwhile price to pay for that freedom. Even if it cannot be satisfied completely at this time, the demand for a neutralized East Germany is nevertheless politically more effective and honest than the demand for reunification.

But if recognition of the Pankow regime is to be granted, it should be given only if—as a countermeasure of equal value—it were to be followed by a corresponding recognition of the freedom of West Berlin on the part of Russia and the East German authorities. But this freedom must be guaranteed as it has been until now by the presence of American troops in West Berlin. By means of this recognition we could approach some temporary, outward form of peace in this area. But recognition of the East German regime is possible for the Germans only if world peace, together with a definite guarantee of West Berlin's freedom, were attached to it. We have to remind ourselves that recognition under such conditions would not alter anything in the cruel state of affairs, but that it nevertheless could ensure the freedom of West Berlin. So far I agree with Lippmann.

But, according to Lippmann's proposal, the Berlin

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situation should then enter a new phase through participation of the United Nations. This frightens me. A clear discussion of this is possible only if the form of this UN participation is spelled out precisely. . . . If some drastic event—as is always possible—caused the UN to make a decision that might have detrimental effects on the freedom of West Berlin, the power of the US and her allies should, as heretofore, stand committed and ready to protect the free status of West Berlin. The presence of UN troops from all parts of the world in Berlin could make the situation worse than it is now. Through such an arrangement, Russia would get her foot in the door. The UN should be officially represented in Berlin only by Allied troops presently there. Bitter experience has shown, moreover, that the UN cannot be depended upon. Responsibility can be hidden behind the UN if there is a disposition to avoid risks. In this respect Lippmann's proposal gives me the gravest concern. His comparison with the Vatican and the Lateran treaties does not seem to me to be correct; that comparison evidences a faith in treaties which is inadmissible in dealing with totalitarian states.

The situation is hard. The self-preservation of free peoples from total subjugation cannot be sustained by treaties. The road to world peace does not lie along the paths of the UN. Somewhere there is a point where the risk of most terrible disaster can no longer be avoided if one does not want to yield step-by-step to extortion and be lost all the more surely in the end.

This point would be approached if traffic to West Berlin, guaranteed by treaty, was hindered by the East Germans, after Russia empowered that state to do so. Such an act of violence would be aimed at depriving two million West Berliners of their freedom with the consequences thereof for all Germans and the entire free world. Should such an act be met with violence or not? It is self-delusion to hope that something can be accomplished through the UN, through arrangements for the moment which would only veil the real danger and would result in the loss of West Berlin's freedom. Were this act of violence by the East German authorities to be tolerated, it would mean a loss of prestige which would have such destructive effect on the confidence of Western nations and on the satellites that an avalanche would be set in motion. . . . If the West wants to live in political freedom, it can only do so if it is ready to meet force with force no matter what the risks.

KARL JASPERS

Basle

McCarthyism in Retrospect

by RICHARD H. ROVERE

I AM CONVINCED that the principal factor in the decline of the late Sen. Joseph McCarthy—and thus a large factor in the decline of McCarthyism—was the man's lack of a sense of mission. Had he believed with any passion either in what he was saying or in the country's need for his services he would not have allowed the defeats he sustained in 1954 — in the Army-McCarthy hearings and in the censure proceedings in the Senate—to have driven him to the despair and alcoholism that characterized his later days.

If I am correct in this, then it follows that McCarthy, had he succumbed to the power he exerted over others for several years, could have had a larger future. If we suppose briefly and for the sake of argument that he had not been faulted by his own unbelief, that demons had possessed him, that his lust for power had equalled his capacity for creating tumult, that he had combined with his matchless ability to bring out the worst in the American mind the resoluteness and endurance of the mass leader who also follows himself—then surely, it seems to me, his and the American future would have been somewhat different. If it is possible to conceive of a more resolute McCarthy, then it is possible to conceive of greater damage to the Republic.

I cannot, however, easily conceive of circumstances in which McCarthy, faulted as he was or freed of his disabling weaknesses, could have become President of the United States or could have seized the reins of power on any terms. To visualize him in the White House, one has, I think, to imagine a radical change in the national character and will and taste. The nation that chose blandness in 1952 and 1956 would almost surely have

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RICHARD H. ROVERE *writes the Letter from Washington which appears regularly in* The New Yorker. *This article will appear as the final chapter of his forthcoming book,* Senator Joe McCarthy, *to be published by Harcourt Brace and Co. on June 17.*

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found McCarthy indigestible as President. It could accept him as a Senator or as a hell-raiser, in or out of the Senate; we seem, in this epoch, to like a tranquilizer in the White House and dexodrine in the Congress. But in the power game, it isn't all or nothing, as McCarthy proved. Having gone as far as he did, it seems clear that he might—had he been a bit more sturdily constructed and a bit more serious about himself—have gone a great deal farther. By building more carefully, he might have exerted a still greater influence over whoever did hold the reins of American power. If history had been cooperative—continuing or increasing the tensions and anxieties and misconceptions on which he thrived—changes in the country's temper might have come to pass that would have made possible a successful bid for power.

THE truth is that lack of experience makes it difficult for us to judge the possibilities of a national demagogue. For a nation that has known of mob rule and that—in its devotion to public liberties—makes mobs quite easily accessible to demagogues, we have had, I think, remarkable good fortune in having had so little trouble with demagogues. There has, of course, been a good deal of demagogy in our politics—for there is a bit of what H. L. Mencken called "the pumper-up of popular fears and rages" in every democratic politician—but, historically, not many men have succeeded, even briefly, in trampling the Senate underfoot or crushing and confounding the generals and commanders. In the 19th Century, there were some formidable demagogues, but in this century, despite increased opportunities and competition, there have been, aside from McCarthy, few who enjoyed any success that is likely to be remarked upon in the future. In 1954, Reinhard H. Luthin, a specialist in such affairs, published a book entitled *American Demagogues—Twentieth Century*. It contained studies of nine men and one husband-and-wife team—James E. and Miriam Ferguson, or "Pa and Ma" Ferguson, who cut some disorderly capers in Texas 40 years ago, each having been Governor of the state at one time or another. On Luthin's list were James M. Curley, of Massachusetts; Theodore Bilbo, of Mississippi; William Hale Thompson, of Illinois; William H. Murray, of Oklahoma; Frank Hague, of New Jersey; the Fergusons; Eugene Talmadge, of Georgia; Vito Marcantonio of New York; Huey Long; and McCarthy. (He might have added the Rev. Charles E. Coughlin, but presumably did not do so because Father Coughlin never sought or held public office.) It makes, when one reflects upon it, rather a cheering list. Except for McCarthy and Huey Long, they were all provincial figures. None was influential much beyond the borders of his state; and some—like Thompson and Hague, who were mayors, and Marcantonio, a Congressman — were of influence mostly within municipalities. (Marcantonio, who ran as a rule on the Republican ticket and unfailingly followed the Communist line, had no personal following outside the Harlem and East Harlem districts in Manhattan.) Furthermore, it is open to question whether all these people really qualify as demagogues by any acceptable definition. Some were only rascals, which is something else again, and some were genuine cranks. At any rate, McCarthy and Long are the only impressive ones in the lot; for the rest, both the evil and the good they did is interred with their bones.

But if I am right in thinking we have been, by and large, lucky, there is no assurance that our luck will hold. There may be several ways of accounting for the fact that McCarthy was our first and only national demagogue, but one factor that cannot be overlooked is that he came along at a time when we were more a nation than we had ever been before, at least in the political sense. The New Deal, World War II and the Cold War "nationalized," as E. E. Schattschneider has put it, American politics. Up to 30 years ago, it was only now and then (generally in times of economic stress) that even the domestic policies of the federal government impinged noticeably on the lives of most Americans. As for foreign policy, when we had any, it was a matter of almost complete indifference to all but a handful. There was very little that either a true statesman or a demagogue could say that would bring responses from every part of the country. Aspirations and anxieties could be exploited by politicians dealing with national and international issues.

It is quite the other way about now. Today it is often difficult to see what difference it makes who is governor or mayor or what their policies are. State and municipal governments administer necessary services and public utilities, but they are less capable of having "policies" than they formerly were, and, in any case, "policies" are likely to be heavily influenced by the federal government, which props up the states with federal aid for almost everything of importance and which thus exercises a great deal of leverage. Federal tax policies, farm policies, labor policies, relief policies, education policies—all these and more matter increasingly to the private citizen. And foreign and military policy matter more than any of the others. It matters so much, indeed, that it was the central reality from which McCarthyism fled. Where one finds fanaticism taking a political form nowadays, it is not over currency or labor or anything domestic (with the exception of race) but over foreign policy.

And beyond all this, there is the "nationalization" that has come about through communications. Radio made a national audience possible, and television has converted the audience into onlookers, from coast to coast.

McCarthy showed that there could be a national demagogue, and it seems to me clear that, had he been a somewhat different sort, his daily prodigies need not have ended in 1954. We cannot know how far he might have gone with them, though I for one am fairly con-

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vinced that he had to stop somewhere short of what might, in American terms, be held the ultimate triumph. We can attempt to estimate, though, how much he was able to accomplish, and we can have, in retrospect, some kind of appraisal of our defenses against the threat he posed.

Among those who thought McCarthy and McCarthyism both an ugly threat and a large one, I tend more than most to be impressed by the power he contained within himself and by the power of the resistance to him, and I am sure that my view on both scores will be heavily discounted by others. The opposite view on both accounts was well and concisely expressed by a young scholar and journalist, Karl E. Meyer, of the *Washington Post,* who has thought much and written on the whole question. He was kind enough to send me for use in a book of my own on McCarthy some of his materials, and in an accompanying letter he wrote:

> It was a disquieting voyage into the recent past to sort through the papers and glance at the headlines of that incredible time when the institutions of society seemed to crumble before the attacks of a man who believed in essentially nothing. I hope your book will throw some light on *why* American society appeared so vulnerable to an adventurer armed mainly (so it seems) by the timidity of his victims.

My book, I fear, throws little light of the sort he asks, for although I recognize this view as one held by many people I respect and admire, I do not share their view of the period. I could not, for one thing, say that the "institutions of society" crumbled before him or even seemed to do so. I believe, as I have written, that his impact on many institutions was enormous and is still to be seen, like shell holes in a fortress wall. It is one thing, though, for a structure to bear the visible marks of a powerful assault and quite another to "crumble," and I am aware of no institutions of any value that disintegrated or fell apart. Nor can I bring myself to agree that McCarthy was armed mainly "by the timidity of his victims." He forged some of his own arms and borrowed others, and he struck with great power.

Some of his victims were timid, some were not. And some, too, including not a few of the least timid, were themselves very vulnerable. Of course, McCarthy, once he began to learn the tricks of his sordid trade, was often careful to choose victims who were either timid or vulnerable or both. Since the truth about a man or an institution was of no concern of his, since he believed in essentially nothing, he had an almost unlimited choice of victims, and when he could he chose the easy ones and passed over the difficult ones. But it was surely not the "timidity" of George Catlett Marshall that made him notable among victims. It was the audacity of Joseph Raymond McCarthy.

Some, to be sure, McCarthy could not ignore. Being a seditionist and attempting to exploit particular grievances, he had no choice but to oppose whoever was President and whoever was Secretary of State. He had, indeed, to set his face against the United States Government and the myriad institutions that made it up. Some of its institutions he damaged a great deal, others not so much, and still others not at all. In some places the damage has mostly been repaired. American diplomacy, which was most gravely injured, seems to have recovered its *esprit*, which does not mean that it has increased in wisdom. Nothing can be done about the time and the opportunities lost, wasted, or misused during the time in which he led the great flight from reality, but at least it has become possible once again to discuss American policy in the light of the national interest rather than in the light of how McCarthyism would respond. This is not to say that policy can in every case be *formulated* without regard to irrelevancies. There never has been such a time; and if, for example, there seemed today to be more profit than loss in granting diplomatic recognition to the satellite government of East Germany, the chances are that, for domestic reasons, we could not take the profit. This may be lamentable, but it isn't novel. And it is nothing like the situation five years ago, when rational discourse was impossible for many men involved in our diplomacy. There have always, in this and other countries, been hindrances to policy that were quite apart from wisdom or unwisdom, but what was so hideous when McCarthy was about was that debate was so often foreclosed. If, today, a State Department expert on Germany or China wished to argue the case for recognition before a Congressional committee, he could do so with no more than a normal—and on the whole healthy—amount of concern over his own career.

If the morale of the foreign service has largely been restored, not as much can be said for the government's scientific enterprises, where the good will of men of a highly individualistic and morally uncompromising sort has always been needed, and still is. And Congressional investigative procedures still bear the heavy mark of McCarthy's influence; it continues to be the habit of many committees to examine American citizens not for the purpose of gaining useful information but for the purpose of tainting their characters before public opinion. McCarthy invented the whole technique of questioning at length witnesses he knew would take the Fifth Amendment, and since his departure other Congressmen have competed for the uncommunicative witnesses and have sought to establish new world records for the number of Fifth Amendment claims they could get from a single witness. McCarthy's records have all been shattered.

I am trying only to make the point that what we have is a mixed bag, that matters vary a good deal from one aspect of government and politics to another. I am sure that one could, without too much effort, prove a lower-

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ing in the whole tone and temper of political debate as a consequence of our experience with McCarthyism. At the same time, it seems to me essential to deplore only what is deplorable and even to note instances of good flowing from evil, if there are any such. I believe that at least one agency of government was actually strengthened by the malaise of the McCarthy years. Protected by the Constitution, by the vital force of a great tradition, and by the strength and character of its own members, the United States Supreme Court took judicial notice of the rents McCarthy was making in the fabric of liberty and thereupon wrote a series of decisions that have made the fabric stronger than before. McCarthy provided the court with one of its finest hours. It is doubtful if the mixed bag contains very many plums, but there is at least this one.

THOSE of us who have been educated in the 20th Century habitually think in sociological terms, whether or not we have any training in sociology. Observing a phenomenon like McCarthyism, we almost automatically dismiss from our minds the notion that a single human being could have much to do with it, even though it bears his name. Obviously, it was a product of "forces" —not of a single living creature. "McCarthyism was a by-product of the Cold War," Joseph and Stewart Alsop wrote. "McCarthyism is *both* a movement supported by certain vested-interest elements and a popular revolt against the upper classes," Talcott Parsons, a real sociologist, explained. "McCarthyism is the revenge of the noses that for 20 years of fancy parties were pressed against the outside window pane," Peter Viereck wrote —thus describing the first nose revenge since *Cyrano de Bergerac.* And there were many similar explanations. Walter Lippmann and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., saw it as a resurgence of the isolationism of the thirties. Samuel Lubell saw it as an attempt to punish those whom many Americans held to be responsible for a whole host of rights and wrongs, going back to our intervention in World War I. Richard Hofstadter felt that the roots went back to the Midwestern and Southern populism of the last century. In a famous television review of McCarthy's career, Edward R. Murrow summed up what was common to all these analyses: "Cassius was right: 'The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars but in ourselves'."

Not for a moment do I doubt the merit in each of these explanations, to all of which my brief summaries do injustice. I am sure that many others could be added to them. When a demagogue finds a grievance or a fault, he exploits it. That is the nature of the beast. But what strikes me about them all is that they leave Joseph R. McCarthy out of the picture altogether. In each, he is only an instrument, a voice, a symbol—or an ailment within us. Perhaps he was, but in that case one is at a loss to know why McCarthyism waited so long to come alive and why it seemed to die—or at least to become greatly enfeebled — when McCarthy succumbed to despair. The grievances and discontents were all there before he came along, and I assume that most of them persist to this day. Others before him had sought to exploit the "forces" he had exploited, and some had enjoyed a certain amount of success; others are attempting to exploit them today—and, indeed, one often sees manifestations of "resurgent McCarthyism," a term which may come in handy some day for some other movement. It would be odd if none of this were to be seen. Life and history go on, and nothing ever dies completely. But assuredly the fevers of McCarthyism subsided in 1954, and most of us knew it and left it.

It is possible, of course, to say that the McCarthy years were only a rather dramatic episode in a broad and continuing historical movement. In *Rededication to Freedom,* Benjamin Ginzburg, who was associated a few years ago with the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, argues this case and argues it well. "These things," he says, speaking of some of the changes since 1954, "mark the passing of the McCarthy phase of the present-day anti-libertarian movement." He cites innumerable abuses of civil liberties over the past few years, many cases of the hounding of government employees and private citizens for their private views and eccentricities, and the continuing nonsense in most of our loyalty and security procedures. The line of argument seems to me of a piece with saying that the fault is in us, not in our stars. No one in his senses would say that McCarthy invented anti-libertarianism; Mr. Ginzburg's "present-day movement" is itself only a phase of a greater one. The point about McCarthy is that when he was on the loose we passed through a time when the "movement" threatened to become a great tide. The fault, we must surely know, was always in ourselves, but he was close to being a genius in bringing it out. Nietzsche had an answer to this kind of reasoning. "Here," he wrote, "is a hero who did nothing but shake the tree when the fruit was ripe. Do you think that was a small thing to do? Well, just look at the tree he shook." It was quite a tree, and it took quite a man to shake it as he did.

The ripest and most fragile fruit fell and were bruised. The Truman Administration was falling of its own weight in 1950. The Eisenhower Administration (if I may work my way quickly out of Nietzsche's metaphor) took office with a debilitating conviction that it is the constitutional duty of an Executive Branch to respond to the will of the people by never opposing the Legislative Branch. The Senate, filled with a terror which may have been moral cowardice but was certainly understandable to anyone who can sympathize with the politician's indulgence in discretion, could not deal with him until he threatened the absolute outrage of destroying military morale in a time of military crisis. The civil servants were frightened because, without protection from the

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White House or the Congress, they were wholly defenseless.

He shook the entire tree, not just the political limbs. Many of the non-political limbs proved weak. The world of mass entertainment — Hollywood, television, and much of the press — cracked badly. Motion picture and television scripts were often studied by learned men to make certain they contained nothing offensive to McCarthyism. Sometimes projects were abandoned because it was feared that the whole conception was offensive to this man and his hordes. Performers even down to deodorant demonstrators were now and then cashiered as "disloyal" or as "security risks." The world of advertising—which is closely linked to the world of mass entertainment if in fact it is not one and the same thing —was similarly asthenic, and it often spread the affliction. Vice presidents in charge of "internal security," commonplace in Rockefeller Center and Hollywood, turned up in breweries, brokerage houses and casket factories.

It was insane, looney and ghastly, but it did not mean that the free human spirit had collapsed. Hollywood has always been a hotbed of conformity, and advertising is always ready to ride with any hounds. By their very nature, these institutions yield before external pressure; it is, in fact, their substitute for inspiration. The difference between art of even the lowest order and mass entertainment is that one is created by internal pressure and the other by external pressure. (The latest complaint is that the mass media are under the influence of the "teen-age market," and if this is a less sinister influence, it is not necessarily less corrupting.) And the sections of the press that capitulated were mainly those that function more to provide public entertainment than public enlightenment.

OTHER institutions showed up much better. Most of organized religion opposed McCarthy vigorously. Despite the inroads he made among working people, organized labor never ceased to criticize him. Here and there a college or a school board did something absurd in response to the atmospheric pressures generated by McCarthyism, but by and large American education resisted. Powerful sections of the press were always hostile. The *New York Times*, the *New York Herald Tribune*, the *Washington Post*, the Cowles newspapers, the Knight newspapers, the Luce publications—all were anti-McCarthy. And so were many influential journalists with readers in all parts of the country: Walter Lippmann, Joseph and Stewart Alsop, Doris Fleeson, Marquis Childs, Drew Pearson, the late Thomas L. Stokes. And on radio and TV there were, in the ranks of his critics, Edward R. Murrow, the late Elmer Davis, Quincy Howe, Martin Agronsky, Edward P. Morgan. If I may inject yet another purely personal note, I may say that as a practicing journalist in those years, writing on political subjects for *The New Yorker, Harper's* and other magazines, I never felt under any compulsion to say anything but what I believed to be the truth about McCarthy and McCarthyism. I got a good deal of disagreeable mail, but I owned a capacious wastebasket, and that took care of the correspondence.

On his seventieth birthday, November 20, 1954, Norman Thomas, a devoted champion of American liberty and decency, and of the liberties of Americans, observed the approaching end of McCarthy's great period and expressed a generally sanguine view. He said:

> In spite of all this [McCarthy, McCarthyism, and other noxious growths of other days], there has been a saving common sense about our democracy. . . . [The] end has always been victory for comparative reason and decency. The struggle against demagoguery scarcely fits the St. George-against-the-dragon myth. . . . Our democratic St. George goes out rather reluctantly with armor awry. The struggle is confused; our knight wins by no clean thrust of lance or sword, but the dragon somehow poops out, and decent democracy is victor.

It was that way in 1954, certainly, and there could be a principle embodied in Norman Thomas' pooped dragon. McCarthy may have suffered an interior collapse because he sensed futility. He may have been himself an unknowing victim of the truth or the myth of our saving common sense. It is possible that McCarthy actually believed John McClellan when John McClellan said he wasn't afraid of McCarthy. The reluctance of the American St. George may have been contagious, and McCarthy may in the end have been a reluctant, as well as a fatigued, dragon. I do not think this conflicts with the view that he was fatally flawed by his inability to believe what he was saying. The cynic may know sooner than other men when he is licked, and McCarthy may well have felt—without having reasoned, for I do not believe he often reasoned—that though greater prodigies may still have been possible for him, the effort to gain them would require that life's blood which no cynic likes to yield.

However that may be, we are faced with the fact that he gave the tree one hell of a shaking. It did not fall, and he did, but we cannot put aside our memories of the day when 50 percent of the people had a "favorable opinion" of this bully and fraud and another 21 percent had "no opinion" of him. There must be grave risks in any open society, Learned Hand has said, and William James might have added that the grave risks make life worth living. McCarthy offered a powerful challenge to freedom, and he showed us to be more vulnerable than many of us had guessed to a seditious demagogy—as well as less vulnerable than some of us feared. We might do well to attempt a more precise measurement of our vulnerability than I have been able to make here.

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BOOKS & COMMENT

Love Letter from the Grave

by Leslie A. Fiedler

The Autobiography of Mark Twain, arranged and edited by Charles Neider (Harper; $6).

SURELY no American writer of the first rank is more consistently misrepresented than Mark Twain. He himself began the process, established the tradition, quite consciously and for reasons he had pondered long and deeply. In a conversation with Elinor Glyn (most improbable of confrontations!), reproduced in this volume, Twain explained once and for all the principles behind his self-falsification: "I said . . . that I, like all other human beings, expose to the world only my trimmed and perfumed and carefully barbered public opinions and conceal carefully, cautiously, wisely, my private ones." He went on to express his scorn for Miss Glyn's notion "that when a man held a private unpleasant opinion of an educational sort which would get him hanged if he published it he ought to publish it anyway and was a coward if he didn't." Not choosing to be a hero, Twain was content to seem a clown or a euphoric rube —dreaming always, however, of a final, necessarily posthumous revelation that would tear away the veil from the true, the *serious* Mark Twain. That revelation he entrusted to several works unpublished in his lifetime, but chiefly to the untidy, diffuse, impossibly bulky collection of newspaper clippings, essays, stories and reminiscences written and dictated, which he thought of as an autobiography.

Tidied up, pruned and forced into the semblance of chronology by Mr. Neider, that "autobiography" appears now, not, of course, complete, but in the form of the widest and most representative group of selections from the unprintable whole yet assembled. Some of Mr. Neider's excisions are prompted by his misguided desire to make order of lovely chaos, some by his wish to expurgate the merely inept and trivial, some by the publisher's need to produce a volume of saleable size; but others are forced on him by Twain's own caution (seconded by his heirs) which led him to label certain sections of his manuscript: "Not to be exposed to any eye until the the edition of A.D. 2406 . . . "

So ingrained had Twain's habits of camouflage and duplicity become that merely being dead did not seem to him a sufficient occasion for releasing *all* restraints; he wanted to wait until he was good and dead! At one point in his text, he observes, "I am saying . . . things in this frank way because I am a dead person speaking from the grave. . . . I think we never become really and genuinely our entire and honest selves until we are dead—and not then until we have been dead years and years." After which he comments wryly, "People ought to start dead and then they would be honest so much earlier." So completely is Twain the victim of gentility and convention (not the prisoner of his wife, as was once sentimentally believed, but of himself) that he cannot conceive honesty as a function of the living.

It is his hopeless submission to this belief, his conviction (half-wish, perhaps) that all men submit even as he which make the *Autobiography* one of the saddest books ever written, a book terrible in a way possible only in America. The final terror, of course, lies in the fact that it is quite possible to read such a book without even knowing that it is terrible; for Twain's long servitude as a funny-man made it difficult for him, even when he wanted to, to cast aside his deceptive mask. The very passages in which he asserts that he has always been a preacher rather than a humorist are spiced with the jokes he cannot help making; his disguise had become a tic. It is the last joke as well as the last horror that Mr. Neider himself, who must have worked patiently and lovingly on the book, can believe it "brings back the tone and flavor of an America which was young and optimistic. . . . Thoreau's America may have contained many lives of quiet desperation. Mark Twain's decidedly did not." Yet the whole point of the *Autobiography* is to make clear that Mark Twain's America contained at least one life of quiet desperation—Mark Twain's. Far from being a work which smacks of youth or optimism, it is the testament of a bleak old man.

The mood is set by Twain's short Preface which concludes, "It seemed to me that I could be as frank and free and unembarrassed as a love letter if I knew that what I was writing would be exposed to no eye until I was dead, and unaware and indifferent." The love letter which he writes from the grave is directed primarily to those who died before him, is the tender epistle of a laggard ghost to those who preceded him. His *leit-motif* recurs again and again: "through Mr. Paine, I learn that Jim Gillis is dead," "Joel Chandler Harris is dead," "*Jean is dead!*" It is almost impossible to open the book at random without coming on such declarations of personal loss, summed up in occasional catch-all elegiacs: "the others have passed from this life . . . peace to their ashes!"

IT is of a pirated anthology of humor that Twain says, "This book is a cemetery; and as I glance through it I am reminded of my visit to the cemetery in Hannibal . . . "; but he might well have written the words of his own work. Certainly the major episodes with their introductory tags seem funeral sermons and headstones, memorializing his brother Henry's death on the river Twain loved and feared; the death of his daughter Suzy during his absence abroad; the death of his wife during a "nervous breakdown" of twenty-two months, during which Twain was forced to communicate with her by notes slipped under her bedroom door; the climactic death of his epileptic daughter Jean. It is not merely the fact of death, but the prescience of death and its haunting after-effects which give the book its prevailing tone. Before Henry is blown up, scalded and finished off with an over-dose of morphine, Twain has dreamed him in his coffin; while in

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her last delirium, Suzy is reported to have taken her mother's dressing gown dangling from a hook as the hanged body of that mother.

Moreover, for each death there is an accompanying pang of guilt: not merely Twain's obsessive belief that providence had played out each catastrophe for his special edification, but a conviction, too, of his own direct complicity. One of Twain's earliest memories was of a vagrant who had burned himself to death in a Hannibal jail with the matches Twain had passed to him through the bars; one of his lifelong torments was the suspicion that he had wished the death of Henry (whom he travestied as Sid Sawyer), even contributed to it by his negligence in overseeing his medical care; and a special source of self-reproach was the death of his only son at twenty months: "I was the cause of the child's illness. . . . I have always felt shame for that treacherous morning's work. . . . "

EVEN those sections of the *Autobiography* not directly concerned with terror and death are influenced by Twain's dark obsession: a discussion of minstrels and their gags begins with the lament, "Where now is Billy Rice?"; while the somewhat embarrassing and certainly disproportionately long panegyric of Grant circles around his deathbed; even a series of light-hearted anecdotes about Hannibal breaks off "but a boy's life is not all comedy . . . " and ends in a crescendo of horror, punctuated by Whitmanesque commentary: "I saw him die. . . . I saw the red life gush from his breast. . . . " A similar pattern imposes itself upon the description of the farm of Twain's uncle, just outside Hannibal, which is the most successful piece of sustained writing in the *Autobiography*. It begins as a lyrical evocation of the Great Good Place now lost forever, a paradise of laden tables and patriarchal peace, surely the most *oral* utopia in all literature, its delights a menu, complete from hot rolls and cornpone through succotash and butter-beans to watermelons, muskmelons and finally apple dumplings and peach cobbler.

But Twain cannot maintain as an ailing and lonely adult the boy's illusion of the innocence of the "heavenly place"; and his reverie leads him inevitably to the figure of "Uncle Dan'l," who in Twain's fiction becomes Nigger Jim, which is to say, a projection of the guilt of slavery. The image of guilt is coupled with the image of death; and just as in *Huckleberry Finn,* through the hush of peace is heard the spinning-wheel, "whose rising and falling wail, heard from a distance, was the mournfulest of all sounds to me . . . and filled my atmosphere with the wandering spirits of the dead. . . ." The progress of every reminiscence is a progress toward death; and it is this drift which gives to Twain's ostensibly orderless book a final shape, bringing him up finally against the ultimate catastrophe of his life, the death of his invalid daughter Jean. "Some day . . ." Twain himself wrote, "it can end my autobiography. It is the final chapter." For making it at last the book's conclusion Mr. Neider deserves real credit; it is his one emendation which clarifies the organic form of the *Autobiography* rather than imposing on it an artificial one.

Twain's son had died nearly forty years before the Christmas Eve of 1909 on which he began to try to come to terms with Jean's death; Suzy had been gone for thirteen years; his wife had been dead for five and a half; Clara, his sole surviving child, had left to take up permanent residence in Europe two weeks before. It was not for Twain, then, merely one more bereavement; it was the end of everything, absolute desolation—and enumerating the dead, who were now his only companions, he did not stop with his family. "Seven years ago," he went on, "Mr. Rogers died—one of the best friends I ever had . . . within the last six weeks Gilder has passed away, and Laffan—old, old friends of mine." Alone in the last of his houses, the seventy-four year old man looked back in horror on his final attempt at reconstituting a family; he had reclaimed a child from the sanitorium and had lived together with her for two days!

It is at this point that Twain's love-letter is finally re-addressed, directed no longer to his dead, but to Death itself. In an odd way, he comes to re-enact the very first death scene of his life, turning into the image of his father, who had died when he was still a child. "When my father lay dying in our home in Hannibal," Twain wrote when much nearer his own death than that remembered one, "he put an arm around my sister's neck and drew her down and kissed her, saying, 'Let me die'." This becomes Twain's simple plea, too. "Would I bring her back to life if I could do it?" he asks of Suzy, and answers, "I would not . . . I have never wanted any released friend of mine restored to life since I reached manhood . . ." If to die is to resolve guilt, to achieve honesty and be released from pain, no wonder we can hear everywhere in the last pages of the *Autobiography* echoes of Puddn'head Wilson's comment: "Whoever has lived long enough to find out what life is, knows how deep a debt of gratitude we owe to Adam, the first great benefactor of our race. He brought death into the world." Though put in the mouth of a fictional character, the words reflect the small wisdom to which Twain believed he had attained.

Four months after the death of Jean, Twain himself was dead—not quite dead enough for absolute candor, perhaps—but as close as he would ever come.

I'm walking on air...



Just had my annual medical check-up. (Smart move.) I'm making out a check to the American Cancer Society, right now—that's a smart move, too.

Guard your family! Fight cancer with a checkup and a check!

AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY

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The Sad and the Sleazy

by T. J. Ross

THE TRAGIC FIGURE of Thomas Hinde's first novel, *Mr. Nicholas*, is Mrs. Nicholas. Her husband is a well-to-do retired gentleman who, with nothing meaningful to do in the sunset of his days, devotes himself to nagging his wife and sons in a sustained effort to transform them into becoming his full-time nurses. In between times, he engages in the romance of his life with a large-chested widow who lives down the way. The sons are moody and recalcitrant; Mrs. Nicholas, generous and loving. She strives to adjudicate fairly in the war of wills in which she is caught, but she is trapped in a social ambience where no one else pays heed to the values and rules which she, however, is held accountable for. Assigned to the role of exemplar of those values she is at the same time expected to serve as the whipping girl for those who see through them. Hers is a tragic situation, bound to lead to a somewhat noble fall; and when, at last, Mrs. Nicholas keels over on her kitchen floor like a mountain climber done in, the gross thud of her fall reverberates right out of the pages of the book and into one's astonished sensibility. *Mr. Nicholas* is the best novel about suburban life ever written; as such, it is fitting that the character who bears its main symbolic charge should be a woman.

Happy as Larry
by Thomas Hinde
(Criterion; $3.95)

Appearing six years later, *Happy as Larry* begins exactly where the suburban novel left off; set in a contrasting atmosphere, it is a further confrontation of questions deftly brought to the surface by the first. Unlike the milieu of *Mr. Nicholas,* where everyone (whatever his secret woes) is shaved, showered and shiny, the Bohemian milieu of the second novel is stewed, sodden and sleazy. Here, no secret is sacred; everyone wears his woes on his sleeve, and loneliness is assumed. To this milieu Larry Vincent has, with great expectations, brought his wife. He is an ex-school master—pleased, at first, that he has removed Betty from her suburban stamping grounds. His point of view is summed up in this sentence: "He wanted more than anything else to make her escape a success because he could not bear her unhappiness." In other words, Larry married Betty in the happy thought that he would save her from the fate of a Mrs. Nicholas.

But what Betty has been brought to proves to be quite as dismal as what she had been rescued from. The story begins at a point where the couple's expectations have been pretty well played out, though Larry is still dimly trying. One might suppose he had read and taken to heart this Thought for the Day from the climaxing chapter of *Mr. Nicholas;* it occurs as one of the sons watches a team of lackadaisical firefighters trying to stem a conflagration which had erupted of a sudden in their backyard:

> He was angry with them for not trying. Everything was possible if you thought it was, and anyway, what an opportunity for a gallant failure; but they didn't want to be gallant and presently some of them were going away; it was past their bed time. He hated them for it, recognizing his own calculation, his own inability to get excited, and desire for comfort and routine. On the burnt heath behind the fire a small animal was running with its coat alight.

As Larry trots off to check a vague job prospect, his wife, recovering from another sobfest, dashes after him to give him a scarf to wear in the bad weather. At her call, Larry turns his head in time to see her struck by a car. As she lurches to the ground, he keeps on walking—the other way.

Leaning on a bar and sobbing, our hero despises himself for his unduly relaxed attitude in the moment of catastrophe. The self-despising leads to his own Thought for the Day, one which interweaves with similar threads from the first novel:

> All his life he had been failing because he had not honestly tried, because duty had been something forced on him by relations without his consent —or something selfish, performed because he wanted approval and at the same time despised himself for wanting it. . . . Now, at last he understood that the first essential for starting to be a real person was to cease to be a person.

"To cease to be a person"—to become something else than just another grabber or emulator. Having, literally, left his wife in the lurch, Larry now feels the total necessity of devoting himself to some non-personal enterprise.

Opportunity follows swiftly on the felt need when Larry learns of the plight of a homosexual in distress. The latter is a politician pal of Larry's, a worthy barrister engaged to a worthy girl. But a compromising photograph has been stolen. Blackmail, the ruin of a political career, impend. What to do?

Larry volunteers to devote himself full-time to tracing down the purloined photograph. His range of suspects is narrowed down to those who were present at a *soiree* during which the photograph was stolen. These include a would-be painter reduced by disappointments to being a ne'er do well; a self-styled general who is really an ex-colonel who writes fishing articles for a living; a homosexual businessman; a moody *dame aux camellias* named Sasha about whom there hovers an aura of "sad unhopefulness"—we soon learn that she is a kleptomaniac; a would-be respectable couple, the Marshes, who continue to live, however, in the bad lands; an ex-cop who would be one still, but is really a full-time drunkard; and Larry himself, a would-be writer who tells people he is a would-be sculptor. (The best of recent fiction is full of such assorted strays.)

THE crime committed, the rest of the action unfolds, as in a detective story proper, by means of a series of interviews between the chief investigator, Larry, and his leading suspects. Like some Gideon Fell or Philip Marlowe, Larry is led a chase through strange and unkempt haunts. He is immersed in worlds where "no sun shines" and where grease is abounding; indeed, grease becomes a motif in the novel, a detail in the decor of each of the habitats which the hero visits. The author's brilliant renderings of a variety of decors is in itself an impressive virtuoso performance. More than virtuosity is apparent, however, in his ability to render sleaziness without making the

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reader feel sleazy, too; which is one way of saying that Hinde, unlike the Kerouackians, is no cranky mudslinger but an artist.

Moving through this ominous ambience, Hairbreadth Larry has the usual batch of scrapes and escapes. He is shot at; he is kicked in the shins; and he has the conventional affair with the *dame aux camellias.* All the while, as in the pure detective genre, the leading suspects begin acting more and more suspicious. Most suspicious-seeming of all is Larry himself for, unlike a Marlowe or a Poirot, he has no special advantage, moral, muscular, or geographical, over any of the other characters. The ominous ambience is his ambience too, and he cannot therefore claim the privilege of an outsider to stand righteously apart. His relationship to his milieu is, perforce, painfully social, rather than cosily isolated. Just as Raskolnikov's garret, say, is as busy a place as Grand Central, with hordes of people running in and out making long speeches, so too, Larry moves in an atmosphere which is bustling and active. Amidst the bustle, there is the same sense of the ineluctable pain of social relationship that we find in Dostoevsky or Chekov.

Though Hinde largely plays with the form of the detective story, I want to assure the reader that he plays fair: there is a clear-cut and satisfying solution to the problem of Who Did It. Keeping his fiction firmly grounded in the art of story-telling, Hinde doesn't undercut the specificity of action or force of meaning by yanking in some airy catch-all platitude about cosmic traumas. But besides its rewards as a detective thriller, the novel also contains sequences which are irresistibly funny.

INTERTWINED with Larry's experience as interviewer are his experiences as interviewee, for while pursuing the photograph, Larry also pursues a job. Imbedded in these sequences are some tips for all prospective interviewees:

> He was developing a manner for interviews, speaking in abrupt sentences, to show that he had character, never qualifying them, however untrue they seemed as soon as he said them. He sat forward in his chair, trying to appear alert but at ease.

Although "Larry had an alarming desire to be honest with him, to say, can't you see I must have a job for money" he resists this alarming desire. Rather,

> . . . He was glad to lie directly. It gave him a feeling of advantage. It was when he tried to say something he thought, and found himself adjusting it for Mr. Knob, suggesting by his tone an agreement which he did not feel, that he was sick with himself.

But Larry's temperament does get the better of him and when Mr. Knob leaves the office to go after some papers, Larry —as heroes of his kidney ever since young Werther have been wont to do— puts his head in his hands and sobs. "He felt unashamed. . . . For a moment he felt that he had got over such a childish feeling as embarrassment at being what he was." He hastens away, leaving Mr. Knob flat. "His overcoat was returned by post. He could imagine how confirmed Mr. Knob must have felt to discover the grease round its collar and its torn lining."

IN ANOTHER interview with a radio station manager, Larry doesn't get off quite so easily. When his replies to queries like "Does the medium excite you?" seem a bit off-key, the irate expert boots him out of his office. The radio man's response to Larry is typical. Larry's problem is the way other people respond to him. As an intellectual man, he has the habit of, on occasion, breaking through the requisites of polite prattle to state what he thinks to be true. This urge to articulate true things well is the main thing that sets him apart from the others in his environment. Except for the *dame aux camellias,* who happens to be in a state of profound inertia, the other characters react to this habit in a common way: they drivel with fury.

The nurses at the hospital where he goes to visit his wife (yes, she lives) drive him from the premises, after he has vainly tried to get his point of view across. He retreats "afraid he would only make them more angry." His efforts at a rapprochement with his in-laws are equally unsuccessful. When his father-in-law addresses him "between narrowed teeth, with a real sound of anger," soft-spoken Larry inquires: "How angry do you get . . . I mean, do you see red?" As his in-law manfully sets himself with a "We're listening," Larry admonishes: "Are you really. Aren't you just waiting to be angry?" This does him no sort of good and he is hurled forcibly from the house.

LARRY is distressed by standardized speech patterns of a sort which he calls "pointless viciousness." His penchant for playing on the incongruities between such patterns and the actualities of human need, does him no good, either. For example, when he phones in reply to an ad concerning an apartment-to-let, he is told, business-like: "The applicant was satisfied three weeks ago." So Larry says, reasonably: "I'm sorry. Would you like me to ask them to take your notice down?" Which evokes this magnificent blast: "Are you sane? I mean it? Are you quite loopy? Who the hell do you think you are poking your stinking little nose into other people's business?"

"Loopy" is not the least of the adjectives applied to our hero. Other stabs at tagging Larry include: "spooky," "telepathic" and "cynic." Here is Larry's own view of the case, expressed in the final one of a series of dialogues on art and fame which he holds with a tipsy test pilot called Tiger.

> ". . . We're parasites . . . We're tolerated because people who haven't time or inclination to wonder if there's any point in life are glad to know there are some people who think so.
>
> "Immortal works of art. It's as much nonsense as immortal life only more obviously silly. We aren't less credulous but more."

To remain "credulous" against all odds and all anger; to assert "point" against a "pointless viciousness"—that is the point of this parasite. His situation is really a traditional one: the eerie situation of the intellectual man in a mass society. In a society where emotional incapacity is the norm, the intellectual man seeks after the sources of an emotional wholeness. Doomed to failure, he nonetheless manages to keep lines of emotional life open, exposed. This accounts for the numerous giggle-jags and sob-fests to which Larry and his friends are prone and which may, at first glance, strike the reader as disconcertingly immature. For Larry puts a special premium on people who can still giggle or sob or lie or love. In an ominous ambience, it is a sign of grace.

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RECORDS

Operas and Songs

LIKE Debussy's *Pelléas,* Poulenc's opera *Dialogues des Carmelites,* on Angel 3585, is a setting of the original text of a play—the play by Georges Bernanos about one of the nuns of the Carmelite Convent in Compiègne who were executed during the French Revolution, this one a fear-ridden girl of the nobility, Blanche de la Force, who enters the convent to find inner security, flees when its inmates are threatened, but in the end finds the courage to join her former associates on the scaffold. Poulenc's opera also resembles *Pelléas* in the way the music serves the play and focusses attention on it: the vocal writing is a melodic arioso which carries the words and at times heightens their expressive effect, while the orchestra introduces, supports and comments on words and action. And even someone like myself who finds that the motivations which produce Blanche's actions and some of the other happenings are not adequate or even clear, and who is therefore left uninvolved by much of the play before its terrible conclusion, can appreciate how accomplished Poulenc's writing is and how suitable for its purpose. Denise Duval, who sings Blanche, has a dry voice that lessens the character's appeal; and the high notes of Régine Crespin, who sings the New Prioress, are almost wild shrieks; but the other soloists and the chorus and orchestra of the Paris Opera perform well under Pierre Dervaux's direction.

Capitol-EMI has issued on GCR-7165 the performance of Verdi's *Don Carlo* that was previously on Victor LM-6124. The work, which precedes *Aida,* has some weak and banal moments, but also some of Verdi's finest writing—notably Philip's *"Ella giammai m'amà"* and most of what follows in the third act (of the four-act version on these records), and Elizabeth's *Tu che le vanità* in the last act. Mario Filippeschi's tenor voice strains and tightens in its upper range and his singing is in other ways unattractive; Boris Christoff's bass is rough-textured; Elena Nicolai hasn't full control of the upper range of her beautiful mezzo-soprano; but there is good singing by Antonietta Stella and Tito Gobbi; the chorus and orchestra of the Rome Opera are good; and Gabriele Santini conducts effectively.

The only post-war recorded performance of Mozart's *Marriage of Figaro* comparable with the great pre-war Glyndebourne Festival performance in light-footed swiftness and grace was the one with Vienna State Opera soloists, chorus and orchestra conducted by Von Karajan, which Columbia issued in 1951 and withdrew a couple of years ago. Angel has now issued on 35326 a number of "highlights": mostly arias, with a couple of duets, the third-act sextet and a fragment of the fourth-act finale. This provides a couple of appearances on the record for each principal—Erich Kunz, George London, Irmgard Seefried, Elisabeth Schwarzkopf, Sena Jurinac; but it omits the other brilliant "highlights" of this incandescent work, including the other great ensembles—the first-act trio and the long finales of the second and fourth acts; and Angel should reissue the entire performance, whose one flaw is the extremely mannered singing of Seefried as Susanna.

Victor CAL-462 offers Flagstad's 1935 recordings of Wagner excerpts (but not, regrettably, the very first one of the *Tristan* finale) and her 1937 recordings of arias from *Fidelio* and *Oberon* and Beethoven's *Ah! Perfido.* They give us the amazingly beautiful voice of those first years—not always cleanly reproduced by this record, and at times a little edged in the later performances from the two years' excessive use; and in addition they give us the way of singing that seemed to be a natural act like a bird's flight, and its unfailing musical rightness.

On LM-2286 Victor has assembled the LP recording of Licia Albanese's performance (in Russian) of the Letter Scene from Tchaikovsky's *Eugene Onegin* with an orchestra under Stokowski, and good dubbings of her earlier 78-rpm recordings of arias that include *"Deh vieni"* from *Figaro, "Batti, batti"* from *Don Giovanni,* Micaela's aria from *Carmen* and *"Qual guardo il cavaliere"* from *Don Pasquale.* The beautiful voice is sometimes dry and sometimes has a strong vibrato; but with the musical taste, the style and the intensity of the singing these are superb and exciting performances.

The tenor voice which in the past twenty years has stood out among all others in the way Caruso's did at an earlier period—by its unique timbre, combined with extraordinary range and power—is Jussi Bjoerling's; and in addition it has been used with a musical taste that Caruso didn't have. The unique silvery luster of the voice in its early years is heard in the pre-war performances of arias from *Martha, L'Elisir d'Amore, Prince Igor* and *Eugene Onegin* (the last two in Swedish) on Victor LM-2269; and the voice's lessened luster but continuing beauty, flexibility, range and power are heard in excerpts from recent complete recordings of *Aida, Rigoletto* and less consequential operas.

ON Angel 35600 are a number of Strauss' best songs — the familiar *Traum durch die Daemmerung, Staendchen, Freundliche Vision, Ruhe meine Seele, Zueignung,* the unfamiliar *Wozu noch Maedchen*—in which Fischer-Dieskau again uses his fine voice with remarkable expressive effect, and Gerald Moore provides excellent support at the piano.

Capitol-EMI G-7155 now offers the *Five Centuries of Spanish Song* formerly on Victor LM-2144: a number of fine songs from the Gothic, Renaissance and Baroque periods, which De Los Angeles makes now moving and now delightful with her extraordinarily lovely voice, her unfailing musical taste and her personal warmth and charm. The accompaniments by modern instruments are suitable in style and character.

Victor LM-2280, *The Art of Song,* has Cesare Valletti in Italian pieces by Sarti, Stradella, Scarlatti, Handel and Pizzetti and songs by Schubert and Schumann, in all of which he exhibits a genuine art in the manipulation of his fine tenor voice and in the treatment of the musical phrase. But the color of the voice and the manner of its use seem to me to fit the Italian pieces better than they do the German ones.

B. H. HAGGIN

Notes on Contributors

LESLIE A. FIEDLER is the author of *An End to Innocence* and other books of criticism. T. J. ROSS is in New York on a leave of absence from Wayne University.

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Correspondence

(Continued from page 3)

asks why we must have 50 states, as if he did not know. Why does Georgia have 150 counties, when 15 would be redundant? Why does that state freeze itself to a bizarre county-unit voting system in electing its major public officials and in disfranchising the great majority of its civilized population?

The same kinds of "peckerwoods" live in New England, and all the way down to Georgia. The preservation of political obsolescence is a hagiolatrous worship of the agrarian tradition. . . . The 84 Senators whom Mr. Johnson would consign to limbo are 84 "Voices of Agriculture," and they will never die, but rather will breed more of their own kind. Remember Canal Zone, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, Guam, Wake, Tutuila and probably some other coral reefs in the South Pacific are yet to be heard from. Those places want Senators too.

O. D. DUNCAN
Head, Dept. of Sociology and Rural Life
Oklahoma State University

► *L'Affaire Luce*

SIRS:

MAY I strongly dissent from your editorial "It *Is* Senatorial Business" (*NR*, April 27). You write: "As far as the public knows the Latin American nations are not at the moment threatened by any great crisis." But the public does not know Latin America, which is facing a social and economic crisis of a magnitude hitherto unknown in that part of the world. The fact is that unless something is done quickly by the United States we are apt to find ourselves with the financial collapse of much of Latin America. Bolivia is the beginning.

The task of American diplomacy at the moment is certainly not that of "solidifying and strengthening the existing amicable relations," a typical Dulles view. Nor are the qualifications for the job of ambassador to Brazil those of "tact, discretion, and amiability, rather than brilliance or aggressiveness." Latin Americans have had just that since the end of the war; they voiced their protest in the Nixon episode.

For *The New Republic* to accept the Dulles view is to demonstrate a lack of knowledge of the situation in Latin America at the present time. Mrs. Luce may be everything that you say she is, but she is a vigorous individual, who would at least have got Brazil and Latin America into the headlines. From this point alone, she would have been good for Latin America, even though she may represent the oil interests—as some Brazilians have indicated.

RAMON EDUARDO RUIZ
Dept. of History
Smith College

The New Republic welcomes communications from its readers in regard to subjects of current interest. Those of 300 words or less lend themselves to publication more readily than longer letters.

► *Form Follows Function*

SIRS:

YOU may be right
About Frank Lloyd Wright
And I may be a rube,
And may be sappy—
But I'm perfectly happy
Living in a "cube."

UPTON SINCLAIR
Monrovia, California

► *Ambassador in the Boondocks*

SIRS:

HUNTER DOWNS' description of Ambassador Jeema Nung of Sarkhan in the Boondocks (*NR*, April 27) was delightful. I took particular joy in the subtle and adroit manner that Nung's lack of practicality and unobservant character was delineated at the outset by his puzzlement over the bamboo pump.

Had young Jeema been a boy of inventive nature he could scarcely have failed to find how easy it is to tap the septums out of a bamboo pole with a curtain rod or broomstick of appropriate diameter. Failing this, had he been observant, he would have had occasion to admire the intricate system of bamboo pipes, fitted end to end, which supply spring water from the neighboring hills to the suburban villas just northwest of his beautiful city of Haidho. I have found Nung's native Sarkhanese carpenters to be even more skillful than others in Southeast Asia in this art.

JOSEPH E. MAYER
Chicago, Illinois

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About Arthur F. Coca, M.D.

Dr. Coca is one of the world's leading allergy specialists. He is Honorary President of the American Association of Immunologists. For 17 years he was Medical Director of Lederle Laboratories. He taught at the Post Graduate Medical School of Columbia University, was a Professor of Immunology at Cornell, has written extensively for medical journals throughout the world. The findings in "The Pulse Test" were first presented to the medical profession in a technical monograph, "Familial Non-reaginic Food Allergy." This book is in its third printing and we can supply copies at $10.50.

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